Latest News

Why one Eastern European nation won't give up its Russian oil addiction: Vladimirov

By Martin Vladimirov

Czechia, on April 7, has the infrastructure, reserves and access to other suppliers that it needs to stop importing Russian oil. Three years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine on a large scale, the Czech Republic still delays this strategic change, despite having viable alternatives.

According to a Center for the Study of Democracy analysis, Czechia will import 2.7 million tonnes of Russian oil in 2024. This is estimated at 1.5 billion euros. This is a 30 percent decrease in volume from 2023. However, this was not the result of a proactive policy aimed at phasing out Russian crude oil. Instead, it was primarily the result three major disruptions on the Druzhba Pipeline.

By the end of 2024, the completion of the Trans-Alpine pipeline expansion should have allowed Czechia to replace Russian crude. The state-owned MERO CR pipeline operator and Orlen Unipetrol, the dominant refiner, have not yet fully utilized this new resource. More than 100 millions of euros are still flowing to the Kremlin every month.

This is not a technical problem. MERO CR had confirmed, even before the final certification of TAL-plus was granted, that the spare capacity in pipelines would be sufficient to meet Czechia’s entire annual crude oil demand.

The country's strategic reserve of 3.6 millions tonnes could also cover almost half its annual consumption. The volume of Russian oil imported in 2024's final quarter increased by 30% compared to the previous year, and reached 970,000 tonnes. This was the highest quarterly level since the European Union oil embargo came into effect in 2022. In 2025, Czechia purchased an additional 220,000 tons of Russian crude.

Orlen Unipetrol claims that Rosneft's long-term contract obligations, which expire in mid-2025 prevent a sudden withdrawal from Russian supplies. It is not certain that this is the case. Take-or-pay provisions - which are often used as a justification – are uncommon in the global oil trade where flexibility of supply is the norm.

Orlen appears to be reluctant primarily due to financial concerns. In 2023 and 2024, Russian crude was on average 20% cheaper than Azeri oil. Retail fuel prices were stable, averaging 1,500 euros for gasoline and 1,360 euro per tonne of diesel. Orlen Unipetrol, which relied heavily on Russian crude oil during its peak years, was able to take advantage of the cost difference and report EBITDA in excess of 600 million euros per year.

The discount on Russian crude could increase in the future, as tariffs imposed recently by the U.S. government may dampen demand for oil globally, forcing Russia lower its prices.

REPERCUSSIONS

This passive attitude has had important geopolitical consequences. Since the beginning of the war, Czechia has contributed almost 3 billion euros to the Russian government in the form of tax revenue. Czechia spent 8.4 billion euro on Russian gas and oil since February 2022. This is more than six-times the amount of money it gave to Ukraine in aid.

Czechia also continues to import refined petroleum products from Slovakia, Hungary and other EU-exempt countries, whose refineries process Russian crude oil. This exemption is extended until June 2025. Slovakia exported 710,000 tons of fuel worth 520 millions euros to Czechia in 2024 despite alternatives being available. Germany, for example, only charges a 6-7% higher price than Slovak suppliers on gasoline and diesel.

Czechia also follows a similar pattern in its natural gas imports. Czechia's Russian gas purchases increased by almost 400% in 2024 in anticipation of Ukraine terminating its Russian transit in January 2025. Imports of Russian gas in the last quarter of 2024 were 62% more than average.

The Czech government can unilaterally ban Russian crude imports. It can also stop purchases of fuels refined using Russian oil in Slovakia or Hungary. And it can make full use both of the TAL pipeline as well as its own reserves.

Bulgaria has shown that a complete phase-out of Russian oil is possible. Sofia ended its exemption early in 2024 by invoking the force majeure clause, and cut off Russian crude over night. The result was neither an increase in fuel prices nor a threat to the security of oil supplies, despite Bulgaria relying on Russian crude for 90% of its crude imports.

Czechia may find it increasingly difficult to justify its refusal to align with European energy security imperatives.

(source: Reuters)